Introductions Introductions
• Constant Round cMPC exists in most of the above models. above models.
Our Model Bounded Player Model Our Model -Bounded Player Model
• A bounded number of players will ever engage in the protocol.
Each player may play unbounded number of sessions.
• Relaxation of bounded concurrency model. y • Improvements over Bare Public Key model. No preprocessing phase No preprocessing phase. Non-blackbox simulation needed for cZK with sublogarithmically many rounds sublogarithmically many rounds.
• cMPC impossible.
Evidence that BP model is close to plain model.
• Assuming standard complexity theoretic assumptions there exists a cZK argument in p g the BPM.
Slightly super-constant round complexity (ω(1)) Slightly super-constant round complexity (ω(1)) Straight-line non-blackbox simulator.
Building the Protocol (Informal) g
Input: x ϵ L h ϵ H
• Non-blackbox simulator obtains trapdoor by sending z, a commitment to a machine Π which predicts r.
• Achieves bounded concurrency. Our model allows for unbounded concurrency (bound is
on number of players).
x ϵ L OR "Trapdoor"
Our Starting Idea Our Starting Idea
• Can we bound the number of non-blackbox simulations required to learn each player's q p y identity?
• Then we could use bound on total number of players to reduce to case of bounded players to reduce to case of bounded concurrency.
The Preamble (informal)
We need to devise a way for the simulator to learn the secret key.
Com(σ )
• Unfair coin flipping protocol
• P proves that σ P is fair using σ P is fair 4 P proves that σ P is fair using Barak's protocol.
5
• V sends encryption of sk under public key σ.
• Proves correctness of ξ using (P WI , V WI ) WI.
ξ is correct
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The Preamble (informal) Com(σ ) Soundness:
• Soundness of (P B , V B ) forces P* to send same value in (3) that
Com(σ P ) to send same value in (3) that he committed to in (1).
• Public key used by V to encrypt 1 2 3 σ P Public key used by V to encrypt is random and so P* cannot know corresponding private key.
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(P B , V B )
• Semantic security means P* learns nothing about secret key. σ P is fair
The Preamble (informal) Com(σ ) Zero Knowledge:
• Simulator can use trapdoor in Barak's protocol to prove a false
Com(σ P ) Barak s protocol to prove a false theorem to V*. We encounter the same issue as someone attempting to extend (P B , V B ) to the setting of unbounded concurrency ξ is correct concurrency.
x ϵ L OR I know sk
